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*** 3 
Abstract 4 
This article contributes to the ongoing debate on the role of public policies and financial 5 
incentives in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+). It 6 
argues that the subordination of policies to results-based payments for emission 7 
reductions causes severe economic inefficiencies affecting the opportunity cost, 8 
transaction cost and economic rent of the programme. Such problems can be addressed 9 
by establishing sound procedural, land and financial governance at the national level, 10 
before REDD+ economic incentives are delivered at scale. Consideration is given to each 11 
governance dimension, the entry points for policy intervention and the impact on costs. 12 
International support must consider the financial and political cost of governance 13 
reforms, and use a pay-for-results ethos based on output and outcome indicators. This 14 
can be done in the readiness process but only if the latter’s legal force, scope, 15 
magnitude and time horizon are adequately reconsidered. In sum, the paper provides 16 
ammunition for the institutionalist argument that UNFCCC Parties must prioritise 17 
governance reform between now and the entry into force of the new climate agreement 18 
in 2020, and specific recommendations about how this can be done: only by doing so will 19 
they create the basis for the programme’s financial sustainability.  20 
*** 21 
Keywords: economic efficiency, economic incentives, multi-level governance, North-22 
South, policy options, REDD+ 23 
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Introduction 1 
In the negotiations for a new climate change protocol that is set to enter into force by 2 
2020 (UNFCCC, 2011b), Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation 3 
(REDD+) is one of the mitigation actions that enjoys most support among the Parties to 4 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Initially conceived as a 5 
straightforward transfer of financial incentives to avoid deforestation in developing 6 
countries, REDD+ has evolved, at least in its conceptual form, into a complex 7 
programme which combines policy approaches and positive economic incentives to 8 
support a range of climate mitigation activities in the forest sector. The programme has 9 
an ambitious goal to reduce, halt and reverse global forest emissions (UNFCCC, 2010, 10 
2011a), which account for 12-15% of total greenhouse gas emissions (van der Werf et 11 
al., 2009).  12 
A lot has been written about public policies and financial incentives as two 13 
complementary but formally distinct approaches to  REDD+ (Angelsen, 2008; Angelsen 14 
et al., 2009; Corbera et al., 2010; Eliasch, 2008; Munden, 2011; Streck et al., 2009; 15 
Wertz-Kanoinnikoff and Angelsen, 2009; Westholm et al., 2011), and several authors 16 
voiced explicit or implicit criticism against the de facto subordination of the policy 17 
approach to the economic approach in the current programme architecture (Clements, 18 
2010; Gregersen et al., 2010; Global Witness, 2009; Karsenty and Ongolo, 2011; 19 
Kanowski e al., 2011; Robledo et al., 2008; Sandbrook et al., 2010). The present paper 20 
contributes to this debate by highlighting that the secondariness of policies compared to 21 
the incentive approach causes severe economic inefficiencies in implementation, which in 22 
turn undermine the programme’s capacity to achieve its stated goal. It disputes that 23 
such problems can be addressed by prioritising policy interventions aimed at establishing 24 
a compound governance system at the national level with focus on three areas: 25 
procedural governance, land governance and financial governance. It also argues that 26 
this can be done during the ‘readiness’ phase only if the latter’s legal force, scope, 27 
magnitude and time horizon are adequately reconsidered.  28 
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The article is organised in four parts. The first part briefly describes the approach 1 
underpinning the current design of REDD+, questioning its ideological assumptions and 2 
highlighting the disconnection between the overarching policy framework and the 3 
emerging practice. The following section illustrates the economic inefficiencies embedded 4 
in such approach. The third section explores how investing in governance can improve 5 
programme implementation. The fourth part discusses the practical and political 6 
challenges to realising governance reforms under REDD+. Finally, the conclusions 7 
elaborate on the cost-saving potential of the proposed approach, as well as on its 8 
political consequences. The economic analysis will be predominantly theoretical and 9 
qualitative. 10 
 11 
1. Theory, practice and inconsistencies in REDD+’s current design 12 
The standard design options in the formulation of an environmental protection 13 
programme are command-and-control regulations and economic incentives (Groosman, 14 
2000). Regulations are promulgated by a legitimate authority with the power to forbid or 15 
restrict environmentally harmful activities and the capacity to enforce any decision to 16 
that effect. By contrast, economic incentives induce conformity with the desired conduct 17 
by appealing to the stakeholders’ self-interest, or the ex-ante calculation of the costs 18 
and benefits of an action (Scott, 2000).  19 
REDD+ has taken a sharply neoliberal approach in discourse by privileging financial 20 
incentives over regulatory measures (Hiraldo and Tanner, 2011; Humphreys, 2009). The 21 
argument is that, if forest carbon is given a monetary value, rational economic actors 22 
can decide between conservation and development based on opportunity-cost 23 
considerations: this way, market forces operate to balance climate objectives and other 24 
legitimate development, with limited need for complex policy arrangements (Portela et 25 
al., 2008). International REDD+ channels payments from industrialised nations to 26 
developing countries that would otherwise lack the self-interest or the capacity to reduce 27 
deforestation and degradation. This approach is consistent with the principle of common 28 
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but differentiated responsibilities enshrined in article 3(1) of the UNFCCC, and it is also 1 
more likely to deliver results given the developing countries’ reluctance to allow a 2 
binding international regulation of forest use (Dimitrov, 2005; Humphreys, 2006; 3 
Humphreys, 2001; Kanowski et al., 2011). The provision of positive economic incentives 4 
is also prominent in national-level implementation, partly because repressive regulations 5 
have been ineffective in the developing countries’ forest sector (Gregersen and Contrera, 6 
2010; Kaimowitz, 2003). Early demonstration activities and international policy 7 
discussions confirm that the ultimate objective of national and sub-national REDD+ 8 
actions is to distribute payments among stakeholders in order to change their 9 
environmental management practices (Alston and Anderson, 2011; Angelsen, 2009).  10 
The theory that economic incentives can efficiently reduce forest emissions is disproved 11 
by a host of practical problems affecting implementation that can only be solved through 12 
targeted policy actions, e.g.: social inequality, tenure insecurity, corruption, widespread 13 
illegality, regulatory deficiencies, general lack of alternatives and capacity, conflicting 14 
development policies, multiple driver dynamics and complex political economies. 15 
Realisation that these problems are widespread and would be a stumbling block facing 16 
any market or non-market effort to reduce deforestation (Angelsen, 2009; Blom et al., 17 
2009; Clements, 2010; Gregersen and Contrera, 2010; Gregersen et al., 2010; Hall, 18 
2010; Kanaowski et al., 2011; Robledo et al., 2008; Sandbrook et al., 2010) prompted a 19 
moderate change in discourse. A new institutionalist perspective centred on the concept 20 
of governance emerged with the introduction of a phased approach to REDD+ (Hiraldo 21 
and Tanner, 2011), whereby the transfer of international incentives builds on the prior 22 
development of ad hoc legal, institutional and capacity frameworks (Vatn and Angelsen, 23 
2009). Developing countries enter a ‘readiness’ process in which they formulate national 24 
strategies, policies and measures assisted by multilateral institutions (Phase 1) (World 25 
Bank, 2011b) and then receive international support for their implementation (Phase 2) 26 
(see: FIP, 2012); payments for changes in and removals of emissions (Phase 3) are 27 
conditional upon the achievement of a status of ‘readiness’ (UNFCCC, 2010, article 73), 28 
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though it is unclear whether at what stage of the implementation of the preparatory 1 
strategies, policies and measures this will be achieved.   2 
The phased approach to REDD+ has not removed the underlying inconsistency between 3 
the international design structure of the programme and the progressive identification of 4 
socio-economic problems requiring policy or regulatory interventions at the national 5 
level. This inconsistency manifests itself in a number of ways. First, the legal force of the 6 
readiness process gives rise to ambiguity. Both the programme’s safeguard policies, 7 
included in the UNFCCC text to mitigate negative social and environmental impacts 8 
potentially arising in implementation (UNFCCC, 2010, Appendix II), and multilateral 9 
requirements for national readiness plans are couched in soft, non-legally-binding 10 
language; the monitoring, reporting and verification of safeguards was dropped in favour 11 
of an optional ‘system to provide information’ (UNFCCC, 2011, Appendix I); and 12 
readiness itself is only encouraged but not mandated in the UNFCCC text (2010, 13 
paragraphs 73 and 74), leaving doubts about the extent to which developing nations 14 
must conform to it in order to receive payments. Secondly, there is a problem of scope. 15 
When drafting national REDD+ strategies or plans, countries are asked to assess and 16 
address a number of elements, yet ‘difficult’ issues such as corruption, planning and 17 
tenure are either overlooked or blandly addressed (Goerg-Williams et al., 2009, 2010, 18 
2011, 2012). This hesitation in dealing with some of the underlying causes of forest loss 19 
can severely affect the programme’s effectiveness and efficiency, as it will be shown 20 
below. The third problem is the timeframe. The general attitude towards readiness is 21 
that policy adjustments must be implemented as rapidly as possible, so as to allow 22 
greater investments in emission reduction activities: this ignores that progress in areas 23 
like governance is built over several years or decades (Evans and Rauch, 1999; Wertz-24 
Kanounnikoff and McNeil, 2012), creating a tension between expediency and 25 
effectiveness. Finally, there is a problem with the magnitude of the support provided to 26 
readiness. Financial assistance, in particular, is materially insufficient to trigger far-27 
reaching reforms in recipient countries and it could at best support initiatives with limited 28 
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impact (for an example, see: FIP, 2012); capacity-building and technical assistance for 1 
governance are also gravely insufficient.  2 
The lack of a clear obligation to reform forest governance structures, the absence of 3 
benchmarks to assess a country’s readiness level, the limited scope and magnitude of 4 
international support for policy and regulatory action, and pressures to move quickly 5 
past the readiness process diminish the contribution of public policies and regulatory 6 
measures to REDD+ in favour of market-based implementation. The next section will 7 
provide further evidence to the argument that governance reform is a prerequisite for 8 
efficiency in REDD+. 9 
 10 
2. Economic inefficiencies inherent to the current programme design 11 
REDD+ is presented as a relatively straightforward, quick and cost-effective climate 12 
mitigation tool (Gullison et al., 2007; Stern, 2007; Eliasch, 2008; Kindermann et al., 13 
2008), but the veracity of this claim is highly dependent upon the quality of the 14 
programme design. Leaving governance reforms to the discretion of recipient 15 
governments with often no capacity or political interest to carry them out (Pesket and 16 
Brockhaus, 2009; Corbera et al., 2010; Skutsch and McCall, 2010) de facto reduces the 17 
ability of international policy-makers to correct flaws in programme design once market 18 
forces begin to operate. Some design failures are already evident and could undermine 19 
the programme’s economic efficiency, which in turn bears consequences on its 20 
effectiveness (Angelsen, 2009).  21 
 22 
2.1. Inefficiencies relative to opportunity costs  23 
On paper, the largest share of resources invested in REDD+ should be used to 24 
compensate the opportunity costs borne by programme participants (Boucher, 2008; 25 
Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009; Olsen and Bishop, 2009). Opportunity costs indicate the 26 
difference in net benefits between forest exploitation and the alternative land use; they 27 
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are thus defined as much by the profitability of the land-use change activity as by the 1 
profitability of the sustainable alternative land use. Ideally, REDD+ would generate 2 
capital investment that would help make sustainable economic alternatives at least as 3 
profitable as deforestation/degradation, consistent with an overarching sustainable 4 
development objective (UNFCCC, 2010, paragraphs 6, 10, 48 and 65). However, it is not 5 
uncommon to find legal, cultural, knowledge-related or infrastructural barriers to the 6 
implementation of such activities (Cohn et al., 2011; Fisher et al., 2011; Klooster, 2002; 7 
Molnar et al., 2007) which, if unaddressed, could frustrate international support in this 8 
area. REDD+ payments would then have to compensate opportunity costs as high as the 9 
entire foregone profit from deforestation/degradation. 10 
Overcoming barriers to sustainable revenue-generating activities may ensure a long-11 
term reduction of opportunity costs, although in the short term it is likely to delay the 12 
implementation and increase the cost of emission reduction activities (Fisher et al., 13 
2011; PRP, 2009). Inefficiencies may occur if, in a rush to secure a carbon transaction, 14 
investors ignore such barriers. This has not been the case of some early projects using 15 
integrated social and environmental standards (CCBA, 2008; SES, 2010) and large-scale 16 
initiatives linked to REDD+ (Rival, 2012), but the evidence is still too scarce and the 17 
pressure to generate carbon offsets too little for concluding that the latter will be the 18 
standard approach. In a large-scale compliance mechanism it is imaginable that 19 
investors’ interest in lowering opportunity costs will depend on the time-lag for the 20 
occurrence of the resulting profits and on the contractual arrangements defining their 21 
allocation; indeed, aside from sustainable forest management, there is little evidence 22 
that the programme will mainstream the implementation of complementary revenue-23 
generating activities. For opportunity costs to be systematically minimised, regulatory 24 
and policy intervention must establish adequate programmes, processes and dedicated 25 
funding streams, as will be discussed in section 3.  26 
 27 
2.2. Inefficiencies relative to transaction costs 28 
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Transaction costs arise from those activities that are necessary to the transparency and 1 
credibility of the programme but which do not generate emission reductions, such as: 2 
the negotiation of transaction contracts; the measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) 3 
of emissions reduction; the enforcement of contracts; and measures to prevent leakage 4 
(displacement of emissions) and to ensure permanence (reversal of emission reductions) 5 
(Allston and Anderson 2011; World Bank, 2011).  6 
Rushing towards performance-based payments for emission reductions (phase 3) would 7 
mean facing higher transaction costs. The MRV and marketing processes carried out by 8 
international intermediaries could cost as much as 40% of the total investment both for 9 
projects (Plan Vivo, 2011) and jurisdictional-level initiatives (Viana et al., 2009). 10 
Economies of scale can reduce these costs (Böttcher et al., 2009; Angelsen et al., 2008), 11 
but scaling up implementation may affect MRV accuracy (Densham et al., 2009); this 12 
creates uncertainties that can only be addressed via conservative accounting measures 13 
which, in turn, increase total costs (Angelsen, 2008; European Commission, 2010). 14 
Furthermore, ensuring the additionality of emission reductions vis-a-vis problems of 15 
leakage and permanence is bound to push transaction expenditures further up; these so-16 
called ‘stabilisation costs’ can be very high (World Bank, 2011), but would decrease with 17 
national-scale implementation (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Angelsen, 2009). Finally, costs 18 
are also affected by inaccurate reference levels for avoided deforestation/degradation, 19 
which is a virtual estimate of the likely level of emissions in the absence of a REDD+ 20 
action. In particular, with the use ‘forward-looking’ levels that take into account national 21 
circumstances and development factors, REDD+ could pay for reducing emissions that 22 
would not have been generated otherwise (e.g. see the case of Guyana: MoU, 2009). 23 
The inefficiency of this approach has been recognised (Karsenty, 2009; Munden, 2011), 24 
with some observers suggesting that it could ‘increase payment by a factor of between 2 25 
and 100 times’ (McKinsey, 2009). The above problems are as much of a technical nature 26 
as they are a consequence of a policy and regulatory void.  27 
 28 
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2.3. Economic rents 1 
Under a market mechanism, private rents could capture a very large part of the 2 
resources invested in REDD+. In a hypothetical ‘perfect system’ payments would be 3 
targeted to the asset holder’s opportunity cost; in practice, information gaps make it 4 
virtually impossible to assess opportunity costs accurately. Rents accrue from the 5 
difference between the total cost of implementing a REDD+ activity and the sum paid for 6 
it. If payments are determined by the market value of avoided or sequestered carbon 7 
emissions, there would be little or no consideration for the actual cost of a REDD+ 8 
activity at the level of credit purchase. Moreover, because the inelastic price paid by the 9 
carbon buyer generates profits for suppliers with low opportunity and implementation 10 
costs, there may be an incentive to cut expenditures to the detriment of non-mandatory 11 
social and environmental co-benefits.  12 
Eliasch (2008) estimates that the combined level of economic rent for carbon suppliers 13 
could mop up between 41% and 55% of the total resources invested. Whether profits 14 
remain with the asset holder or are captured by financial intermediaries will depend on 15 
the specific contractual arrangements. But there are strong indications of where the 16 
balance would lie. In the case of the Rimba Raya REDD+ project in Indonesia, the 17 
Russian gas giant Gazprom was designated as the sole financial intermediary and 18 
marketer of carbon credits; a report from Reuters revealed that the company would 19 
benefit from 56% of the credit’s first pricing in the secondary market (Fogarty, 2011). 20 
The enormous profit for international investors acting as financial intermediaries is only 21 
partly explained by the legitimate expectation to make returns proportional to the 22 
investment risk (CMIA, 2011), which is particularly high due to the volatility of carbon 23 
price and to governance problems in developing nations. A more decisive factor may be 24 
that the carbon market could be dominated by few financial intermediaries with the 25 
capacity to source and aggregate forest carbon credits from a multiplicity of projects and 26 
the power to dictate the price of the asset purchased – i.e. an ‘oligopsony’ or 27 
‘monopsony’ (Munden, 2011). In this scenario, the distribution of profits could mirror 28 
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existing commodity markets allocating over 60% of the global investment to 1 
intermediaries, 30% financing project costs, 5% captured by governments, and a mere 2 
3% covering the opportunity cost of REDD+. These figures mirror the distribution of 3 
profits and resources in other commodity markets (Munden, 2011).  4 
It is also quite possible that government elites will act as rent-seekers in REDD+ 5 
implementation, especially in countries were most forests already belong to the State 6 
(Knox et al., 2011). This would be an even likelier prospect if untransparent and corrupt 7 
governments were to claim exclusive tenure rights over forest carbon and act as 8 
financial intermediaries. Regulatory action and targeted policies at the national level are 9 
thus needed to regulate profit allocation so as to prevent the inappropriate or illegitimate 10 
appropriation of rents by private investors or public actors. 11 
Taken together, the inefficiencies of the current programme design are substantial and 12 
severely hamper its effectiveness, particularly considering the relative scarcity of 13 
resources (e.g. compare available cost estimates, Eliasch, 2008, with the programme’s 14 
financial firepower, REDD+ Partnership, 2012). In order to maximise the efficiency of 15 
REDD+, the following leverage points can be addressed through regulatory and policy 16 
measures, as will be discussed in the next section: 17 
 Opportunity costs can be minimised by removing barriers to the implementation 18 
of sustainable alternatives to deforestation/degradation; 19 
 Monitoring, protection and stabilisation costs can be lowered by recognising 20 
stakeholder rights and improving their participation; 21 
 Government rents can be reduced by improving transparency and accountability 22 
in decision-making; 23 
 Speculative financial profits can be controlled by establishing a profit ceiling for 24 
intermediaries (private and public), or by better regulating their operations. 25 
 Transaction costs can be reduced by setting more credible reference levels which 26 
ensure additionality; 27 
 Transaction costs can also be lowered by bundling together projects and 28 
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programmes which creates economies of scale in MRV, financing and crediting; 1 
 2 
3. Policy priorities for REDD+: three dimensions of a national governance 3 
system 4 
Forest loss is a complex phenomenon with ramified consequences on various sectors of 5 
the economy and society. Therefore, regulatory and policy action in this area cannot 6 
consist of isolated, ad hoc interventions but it should be framed within a broader 7 
governance context. The elusive concept of ‘governance’ (Kaufman et al., 2010; 8 
Krahman, 2003; Mimicopoulos et al., 2007; Palmer et al., 2009), has been defined as 9 
‘the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a 10 
country’s affairs at all levels [...] comprising the complex mechanisms, processes and 11 
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their 12 
legal rights and obligations, and mediate their differences’ (Plamer et al., 2009).  13 
Across the multiple levels of operation of REDD+, the main (though not the only) 14 
interlocutors of the international community are the developing country governments 15 
bearing responsibility for the actions that are taken to reduce emissions (outputs), as 16 
well as their measured effectiveness (impacts). This is particularly so under national-17 
level implementation. This section will focus on three specific dimensions of governance 18 
that constitute the building blocks of an archetypal national system, albeit with the 19 
caveat that there cannot be a ‘one-size–fits-all’ approach in this field (Angelsen et al., 20 
2009). Some of the ideas presented here are less original than others, but attention is 21 
drawn to their mutual interconnectedness: (1) good procedural governance builds the 22 
conditions for establishing (2) a sound land governance system mapping out a country’s 23 
vision for sustainable development, which is then realised using (3) a dedicated financial 24 
infrastructure and support services to distribute incentives and investments (financial 25 
governance).  26 
 27 
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3.1. Procedural governance 1 
Just as procedural justice defines the character of a fair judicial process, procedural 2 
governance is here intended to define a fair and effective process by which decisions 3 
regarding the public sphere are taken (formulation) as well as the means through which 4 
these decisions are implemented and enforced (execution). Policy effectiveness rests on 5 
the objective quality of decisions as much as on their perceived legitimacy (Palmer et al., 6 
2009), which in turn is strenghtened by a sound governance process. The formulation 7 
and execution of public policies in rainforest nations is often so defective that it severely 8 
limits a government’s ability to function (Corbera et al., 2010; Karsenty and Ongolo, 9 
2011; Tacconi et al., 2010; World Bank, 2006), and REDD+ payments could exacerbate 10 
these problems if adequate action is not taken upfront (Hansen et al., 2009; Phelps et 11 
al., 2010; Sikor et al., 2010; Tacconi et al., 2009; Cadman and Maraseni, 2012).  12 
Four areas stand out, among others, as core determinants of governance quality: 13 
transparency, citizen participation, freedom from corruption and predominance of the 14 
rule of law (FAO, 2011; Mimicopoulos et al., 2007; Sheng, 2012; UNDP, 1997). Of these, 15 
only participation is consistently addressed in REDD+ readiness. Further policy and 16 
regulatory measures - such as law enforcement support programmes, judiciary reforms, 17 
anticorruption legislation and so forth - should be pursued throughout the readiness 18 
phase in synergy with existing social development programmes. These elements can also 19 
be looked at from an equity perspective, for instance as advocated in the right-based 20 
approach to REDD+ (Hiraldo and Tanner, 2011). Embedding the social dimension in 21 
programme implementation is thus essential to its effectiveness and efficiency. 22 
Because a government’s general modus operandi affects decisions in the land use and 23 
forest sectors, focusing on forest governance only downplays the importance of systemic 24 
institutional changes (Tacconi et al., 2009). The cross-sectoral aspect of procedural 25 
governance is particularly important in REDD+ because it provides a means for fostering 26 
cooperation (i.e. between national and international stakeholders, public authorities, 27 
interested communities and businesses) in a sector where no single actor is in a position 28 
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to unilaterally control the behaviour of the others. The national government acts as a 1 
linchpin in this complex relationship between governance levels and within a multi-2 
stakeholder process that emphasises the role of sub-national public and private entities 3 
(Alston and Anderson, 2011; Emerson et al., 2011; Forsyth, 2009).  4 
Improving procedural governance has an indirect effect on REDD+ in so far it creates an 5 
enabling environment for its effective and efficient implementation. More obviously, it 6 
would reduce rents and implementation costs by contrasting the illegal appropriation of 7 
resources by public or private actors; it would lower stabilisation costs by favouring the 8 
emergence of political support for REDD+ and contrasting the privatisation of the 9 
political agenda (Karsenty and Ogolo, 2011); it could also help reduce opportunity costs 10 
by helping to identify the entry points for addressing the drivers of forest loss; 11 
furthermore, given the extent of the existing conservation commitments and the 12 
emissions generated in areas formally under protection, improving developing countries’ 13 
capacity to implement and enforce environmental laws and policies could go some way 14 
towards achieving the programme’s goal (Wertz-Kanounikoff and Kongphan-anpirak, 15 
2009; Kanowski et al., 2011). Instead of duplicating the work of governance 16 
programmes already in place, REDD+ could breathe new life into current international 17 
efforts raising their profile, providing additional resources and making them a political 18 
priority. There are evident limits to what can be achieved under REDD+ in this area but 19 
also concrete opportunities, as will be discussed in section 4. 20 
 21 
3.2. Land governance 22 
The main driver of forest loss is market demand for wood and agricultural crops (FAO, 23 
2010; Gibbs et al., 2010). Over the long term, REDD+ must both restrain the demand 24 
for such products and make their supply more efficient using existing lands. But while 25 
internationally agreed demand-side measures could only enter into force as part of the 26 
2020 climate agreement, supply-side measures could be introduced in developing 27 
nations before 2020 through the REDD+ readiness process.  28 
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Improving land governance can indeed make the supply of forest and agricultural 1 
products more efficient. Land governance denotes ‘the policies, processes and 2 
institutions by which land, property and natural resources are managed’, and it includes 3 
‘decisions about access to land, land rights, land use and land development’ (Deininger 4 
and Enemark, 2010). One way to improve land governance is by supporting land 5 
administration systems, which provide the infrastructure for implementing land policies 6 
and land management strategies (Palmer et al., 2009; Williamson et al., 2010). Many 7 
developing countries would benefit from financial and technical assistance in this area 8 
(Dalal-Clayton and Dent, 1993; Dalal-Clayton et al., 2000; Deininger et al., 2010; 9 
French and Natarajan, 2008; Larson et al., 2008). Although the exact interventions 10 
needed to improve land administration can only be defined by nationally-specific 11 
diagnostics, two focus areas seem particularly relevant in this context: tenure security 12 
and spatial planning. Security of land and forest tenure – which includes the legal 13 
recognition of informal rights (through registration, certification or other means) and 14 
their protection against competing claims (Wendland, 2011) – is still very low in tropical 15 
forest regions (Almeida et al., 2012; Sunderlin et al., 2008; White and Martin, 2003). 16 
Tenure security is crucial to the effectiveness of REDD+ and other incentives that 17 
challenge unsustainable models. For example, it could address the drivers of 18 
deforestation (agricultural expansion) by attracting investments in agricultural 19 
productivity in low-carbon regions, and forest degradation (logging) by promoting 20 
community-based sustainable forest management (Sunderlin et al., 2008; Sayer et al., 21 
2008); it could ensure permanence of emission reductions and prevent leakage by 22 
promoting participation of de facto forest users (Cotula and Meyers, 2009); moreover, it 23 
could provide legal certainty to the distribution of benefits and responsibilities in REDD+ 24 
implementation by defining rights over land, forests and carbon (Angelsen, 2009; Cotula 25 
and Meyers, 2009; Deininger et al., 2010; Knox et al., 2011; Mitchell and Zevenbergen, 26 
2011). But under certain conditions tenure security can increase forest loss: e.g., the 27 
promise of secure tenure rights on ‘empty’ forestlands may attract migration towards the 28 
forest frontier (Pfaff et al., 2010); similarly, where secure tenure drives agricultural 29 
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intensification in the forest frontier, this may result, absent other policy interventions, in 1 
the continued conversion of forests (Carr, 2004). Removing perverse incentives of this 2 
kind is therefore as important to REDD+ as providing legal certainty to tenure. 3 
Spatial planning introduces an element of collective rationality and resource efficiency in 4 
the way the territory is used. Two approaches are relevant for REDD+. The first is 5 
segregation, a place-based approach that relocates harmful activities into less carbon 6 
dense ecosystems. Spatial segregation is relevant for commercial drivers of land use 7 
change and is most suitable to protect relatively intact, remote areas with sparse 8 
population. Indeed, it must consider infrastructure planning so as to prevent forest 9 
access (e.g. building railways instead of roads, redesigning routes and planning 10 
protective measures when new roads open access to forest areas). Examples of 11 
segregation are the relocation of palm oil production onto degraded lands in Indonesia 12 
(Gingold et al., 2012; Ruysschaert et al., 2011) and land sparing through cattle 13 
intensification in the Brazilian Amazon (Cohn et al., 2011). In contrast, spatial policies 14 
that facilitate the integration of the human and natural subsystems at landscape level 15 
are most relevant where local people are driving deforestation and should therefore be 16 
standard practice in densely populated forest frontiers. The aim of spatial integration is 17 
to promote a transition towards ecological forms of land use which do not exclude 18 
economic development (Geisler, 2010; Whatmore and Boucher, 1992). A participatory 19 
planning process based on the registration of tenure rights and on the collective 20 
negotiation of their restriction can more easily identify alternative development 21 
opportunities at the landscape level and appropriate entry points for the best use of 22 
REDD+ funds (Goodstadt and Rosário Partidário, 2009). An example of such approach in 23 
the REDD+ context is provided by Fisher et al. (2011), whose empirical study in 24 
Tanzania showed that helping local people use their resources more efficiently inherently 25 
addresses the causes of forest loss. Not only does this lower the opportunity cost of 26 
REDD+, but it can also reduce implementation and stabilisation costs by providing a 27 
platform for stakeholder cooperation in carbon monitoring and protection, enhancing 28 
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coordination across sectors and levels of government and generating information that 1 
increases the accuracy of reference levels.  2 
 3 
3.3. Financial governance 4 
As explained in section 1, REDD+ privileges monetary incentives over repressive 5 
regulations to break with the unsustainable pattern of production and exploitation. 6 
Investments in procedural and land governance are thus a necessary but insufficient 7 
condition for reducing forest emissions. One of the main tasks of international REDD+ is 8 
to build a framework for the generation of dedicated financial resources (Parker et al., 9 
2009). While this will likely be regulated by an international framework, the mechanisms 10 
that deliver finance to national and sub-national entities will probably be country- or 11 
even context-specific (Angelsen, 2009). In order to realise the change in development 12 
patterns agreed in the planning process, a transparent and equitable distribution of 13 
incentives among domestic stakeholders legitimated by secure tenure rights is key. Such 14 
result cannot be achieved by merely deregulating or liberalising the flow of international 15 
capital (Rankin, 2001); instead, public authorities can and should play a more active role 16 
of intermediation (Zadek et al., 2009). This can be done through the establishment of a 17 
dedicated financial infrastructure and the targeted provision of business development 18 
services (BDS).  19 
The financial infrastructure – i.e. the institutions, information, technologies and rules 20 
enabling financial intermediation (World Bank, 2009) – influences how different actors 21 
gain access to funds within a jurisdiction. REDD+ will probably need its own set of rules 22 
and institutions to manage a combination of national and international grants, loans and 23 
results-based payments, dedicated funds as well as other resources which can contribute 24 
to the programme goals vis-a-vis a wide spectrum of potential beneficiaries. Its task 25 
would be to distribute resources at scale, where they are most effective, through a 26 
transparent process and at favourable conditions for the recipient (i.e. on a non-27 
commercial basis) so as to promote compliance. Additionally, a dedicated financial 28 
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infrastructure would have the capacity to combine different funding streams for realising 1 
actions with multiple impacts (such as climate adaptation, biodiversity protection and 2 
rural development) and leverage standard investments in low profitable activities which 3 
are capable of delivering REDD+ objectives. These synergies would provide substantial 4 
savings in all cost categories. 5 
The shape of a financial infrastructure will change according to the chosen 6 
implementation mechanism. In case of centralised management of REDD+ finance, 7 
resources could converge into a trust fund or ‘green development bank’ and be disbursed 8 
(as grants or low-interest loans) by financial and micro-financial institutions across the 9 
territory in such a way as to prioritise social and environmental protection over 10 
profitability (Rankin, 2001; Wenner et al., 2004; Vatn and Angelsen, 2009; Zadek et al., 11 
2009). This could reduce opportunity and transaction costs, especially if the micro-12 
financing model becomes economically sustainable, but particular emphasis should be 13 
placed on establishing mechanisms that ensure transparency and accountability in 14 
REDD+ revenue management so as to prevent rent-seeking behaviour by government 15 
officials. A well-known model of financial intermediation in the context of REDD+ is 16 
Brazil’s Amazon Fund, a national funding entity that combines public and private 17 
resources dedicated to forest-based climate mitigation (Zadek et al., 2010). Another 18 
proposal relevant to REDD+ envisages the creation of a sustainability-oriented financial 19 
infrastructure that taps into available private capital using standardised financing 20 
schemes (i.e. without creating a new asset class such as carbon), and is backed by 21 
public resources (Munden et al., 2012).  22 
If a country opts for a decentralised model of implementation, excessive private rents 23 
(see, for instance, the problem of ‘carbon cowboys’: Carbon Positive, 2009) could also be 24 
tackled by an authority that oversees the relations between local stakeholders and 25 
international investors, or a specialised ombudsman. Alternatively, regulation can 26 
establish a limit to the profit of intermediaries and impose an equitable redistribution of 27 
surpluses among stakeholders beyond that ceiling. Finally, where relocation of 28 
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commercial activities is necessary, public authorities could balance strict environmental 1 
regulations with favourable credit conditions or subsidies for relocating agri-businesses 2 
onto suitable low-carbon lands. It is crucial that these corrective measures be thought 3 
through and harmonised at the international level before market-based implementation 4 
is allowed: leaving them to the discretion of developing countries competing to secure 5 
foreign investments may cause a race to the bottom similar to other regulatory 6 
environments (Mehmet and Tavakoli, 2003). 7 
Finally, the financial governance system should also build the conditions for the efficient 8 
and effective use of REDD+ incentives at the local level, for instance through 9 
sustainability-oriented BDS (see Wenner et al., 2004). BDS lower opportunity costs by 10 
facilitating the development of remunerative economic alternatives to deforestation, 11 
allowing a gradual shift from grant-based support to loans and the creation of an 12 
economic environment that reduces dependency from international assistance. This 13 
deviation from the results-based disbursement of incentives acknowledges that, as 14 
explained in section 2, information gaps play a major role in fostering unsustainable 15 
development models and require upfront investments in capacity building. BDS are 16 
important under any funding mechanism though their content should be tailored to the 17 
recipients’ preferences and circumstances. 18 
 19 
4. Challenges in reforming governance through REDD+ 20 
Looking at past experience (Santiso, 2000), it is clear that REDD+ cannot singlehandedly 21 
solve governance problems across the tropics, and it is hard to predict how much 22 
difference it can make. A probabilistic (rather than deterministic) perspective is 23 
warranted: there is no certainty that international support will improve governance but 24 
chances will likely increase the more resources and political capital is invested.  25 
Nevertheless, there is much that the international community can contribute in terms of 26 
technical, financial and political support. Technical assistance for governance reform is 27 
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important to improve problem diagnostic and the formulation of possible solutions, 1 
especially in highly specialised areas such as land tenure, planning, financial 2 
infrastructure and the development of sustainable business models. Assistance to set up 3 
credible monitoring of decision-making and outcomes is crucial to address procedural 4 
governance problems (Global Witness, 2009). Financial assistance can cover the material 5 
costs and lost profits of implementing the reforms, such as establishing new institutions, 6 
strengthening monitoring and enforcement capacity, relocating activities or intensifying 7 
production in non-forested lands (see, for instance, the Ulu Masen project in Indonesia: 8 
Rafli et al., 2007).  9 
REDD+ most important contribution is that it can generate political momentum to move 10 
forward in this area. The implicit theoretical tenet in this discussion is that States are 11 
self-interested actors which seek to maximise their individual utility, and participation in 12 
REDD+ is only possible if state interests are protected. As seen above, the programme 13 
frames State interest in merely economic terms, i.e., whether participation will bring 14 
more benefits or constraints to the economy. Two further elements affecting the 15 
acceptability of the programme are its international political significance (e.g. how much 16 
national sovereignty is eroded) and its consequences on the domestic political economy 17 
(i.e. how participation shifts power among social groups and how this affects political 18 
support). These interest variables are independent of each other or even conflicting: 19 
political economy considerations may contrast with considerations about the overall 20 
economic benefit of participation; economic incentives may convince a government to 21 
relinquish part of its sovereign control and so forth. Including governance reform in the 22 
readiness phase arguably generates long-term economic benefits for developing 23 
countries, yet these are too uncertain and distant in time; by contrast, international 24 
pressure to reform national governance would be seen as an intrusion in domestic 25 
affairs, while conferring tenure rights on local communities and empowering them with 26 
favourable financial conditions may run against the interest of powerful domestic actors. 27 
It is no surprise therefore that strong international overseeing of governance is opposed 28 
  
20 
 
by developing countries (Verchot and Petkova, 2010).  1 
There are counter-arguments to this. Governance reform is often sought by stakeholders 2 
that are losing out under current arrangements: empowering them reinforces domestic 3 
pressure for change, which contributes to creating a sense of national ownership of the 4 
reform (Santiso, 2000). Because participation in REDD+ is voluntary and States are in 5 
charge of their reform process, the international community would merely act as a 6 
willing counsellor and supporter. Moreover, financial incentives can be used 7 
instrumentally as rewards for governance reform so that the rhetorical stick of political 8 
pressure is matched by a very material carrot that – quite literally - pays the political 9 
price of reform (as a comparable model, see: CPIA, 2010). In other words, the results-10 
based ethos of the programme could be as well applied to governance assistance, 11 
though some will have to be provided upfront. 12 
Those resources that are delivered on a pay-per-result basis need an ad hoc (i.e. distinct 13 
from carbon) metrics to measure governance performance. Intermediate financial 14 
rewards could be awarded based on output indicators (e.g. strategies, policies and laws 15 
adopted, institutions created, population consulted etc). Participation in the third phase 16 
of the programme, which is expected to deliver payments measured in billions of dollars 17 
(Eliasch, 2008), could be made conditional to the outcomes of governance reform (e.g. 18 
some measure of the actual transparency of decision-making processes, the progress of 19 
tenure clarification, the rule of law as perceived by stakeholders etc) but not on impacts 20 
(i.e. quantified emission reductions), since improvements in governance do not directly 21 
generate emission reductions. It is crucial that governance indicators are agreed 22 
between donor and recipient countries through a participatory multilateral process which 23 
combines technical and political elements, such as those led by the UNFCCC subsidiary 24 
bodies.  25 
A further problem is that governance is known to change very slowly (Evans and Rauch, 26 
1999; Wertz-Kanounnikoff and McNeil, 2012). Not only does this require a long-term 27 
international commitment to support the process, but it also creates a conflict with those 28 
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interested in progressing swiftly with REDD+ implementation. This problem must not be 1 
overstated: first, because – as said above – phase three of REDD+ will not be 2 
implemented at scale at least until 2020; second, because some countries are not too far 3 
from having the capacity to move to phase 3 (Estrada, 2012), chiefly Brazil (Wertz-4 
Kanounnikoff and McNeil, 2012); finally, because there is scope to move ahead with 5 
REDD+ implementation even if some governance problems persist, as long as 6 
performance as a whole is deemed acceptable. 7 
All in all, governance reform will be possible only if some support is found at all levels of 8 
governance: the international community must be willing to invest time, financial 9 
resources and political capital; national governments must have control over the process 10 
and objectives without being ‘pushed’ too hard; and stakeholders must feel that their 11 
interests are protected or at least duly compensated. In this light, rather than an 12 
insurmountable constraint, the UNFCCC and other international fora are to be seen as 13 
opportunities to raise the profile of these issues and to reinforce direct cooperation 14 
among willing actors, especially between the sub-national and international levels.  15 
 16 
Conclusions 17 
Substantial resources were invested in forest conservation in the past, with little success 18 
(Sizer, 1994). This does not mean, as some have suggested (FERN, 2011), that 19 
increasing financial resources for forest protection is unnecessary. But the provision of 20 
incentives alone is unlikely to succeed, chiefly because the limitedness of regulatory 21 
policies could greatly increase opportunity and transaction costs, while also allowing rent 22 
seekers to capture much of REDD+’s resources. This paper reinforces the institutionalist 23 
argument that REDD+ cannot be delivered by markets without previous investments in 24 
national-level governance because rushing towards results-based payments for changes 25 
in emission reductions would be a very inefficient and ineffective use of international 26 
resources. Yet, at the same time, the analysis also corroborates the social equity 27 
argument that effectiveness depends on whether investments reinforce a decentralised, 28 
  
22 
 
right-based approach to governance. 1 
The absence of adequate information on current and alternative policy scenarios means 2 
that a global quantitative estimate of the potential savings generated by investments in 3 
governance cannot be provided. Such calculations are better framed within a national or 4 
sub-national context, while at this level of analysis it is only possible to make some 5 
general considerations. Some studies provide quantitative indications of readiness 6 
investments that cover the material cost of some moderate policy reforms. For instance, 7 
a UNFCCC-commissioned report (2009) estimates readiness investments to be in the 8 
range of US$ 400-700 million a year compared to US$ 3-6 billion a year for opportunity-9 
cost compensation (for a total cost of roughly US$ 4-7 billion). Other estimates put 10 
readiness costs even lower compared to other cost categories, particularly transaction 11 
costs and rents (Eliasch, 2008; McKinsey, 2009). This suggests that even modest 12 
reductions in opportunity and transaction costs would likely offset any additional 13 
investment in readiness. Moreover, readiness expenditures are bound to be higher at the 14 
beginning, when most far-reaching changes are envisioned, gradually diminishing over 15 
time as governments strengthen their natural resource management capacity and 16 
practices. In contrast, the savings from reduced opportunity and transaction costs 17 
continue to accrue over a much longer period (i.e. the time of operation of the 18 
programme). Greater upfront investments therefore generate long-term economic 19 
efficiency as well as a more balanced approach to the sustainable development of 20 
tropical regions. In other words, investing in governance would bring the cost of REDD+ 21 
to peak earlier and at a lower level than the concurrent design, making the cost curve 22 
downward sloping rather than upward sloping as in a business-as-usual REDD+ scenario 23 
(i.e. as dictated by increasing commodity demand and population).  24 
A further argument to support investments in procedural and land governance has to do 25 
with risk. If a global REDD+ mechanism fails to materialise after 2020, investments in 26 
carbon related technologies and institutions would be rendered useless, while 27 
investments in these areas would still have positive impacts on the environment and the 28 
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development of recipient countries (Westholm et al., 2011). This could, incidentally, still 1 
reduce forest emissions in the absence of an international legal framework. 2 
Additionally, improving national governance systems could also alleviate potential 3 
conflicts with the development agenda. The level of public resources mobilised to date 4 
rings an alarm bell re the political commitment to reduce forest emissions: if REDD+ 5 
pursues an aggressive conservation agenda disregarding, or even competing with other 6 
policy objectives such as poverty alleviation and agricultural production, high-level 7 
political support could vanish altogether. In particular, it is likely that food security 8 
concerns will aggravate in an increasingly crowded and hungry world battered by 9 
extreme weather events, new pests and declining biodiversity (Beddington et al., 2011). 10 
Although our understanding of the ecosystem services provided by forests will increase 11 
(as a driver of global change, as a buffer against extreme weather events and as a 12 
regulator of local climate), if governments perceive that food security is at risk as a 13 
result of an ‘unpredictable’ food crisis, the political imperative to increase agricultural 14 
production would override any interest in protecting forests. The effect of these shocks 15 
cannot be estimated in advance, but they should be considered at least at the theoretical 16 
level. A solid governance framework must thus harmonise REDD+ environmental 17 
objectives with domestic sustainable development agendas, consistent with the shared 18 
vision of the treaty (UNFCCC, 2010, paragraphs 6, 10, 48 and 65). 19 
Finally, it must be stressed that the phased approach of the current design of REDD+ 20 
can be maintained. In particular, as both the international legal framework for REDD+ 21 
and major forest carbon markets are not poised to be operational at least until 2020 22 
(UNFCCC, 2011b), there is time to deal with the current problems in the readiness 23 
phase. In order to achieve this, readiness must be re-conceptualised. Its legal force 24 
must be strengthened in the negotiating text, also ensuring that thorough monitoring 25 
and verification is required and that progress to subsequent phases is conditional upon 26 
advances in readiness. The magnitude of support must be reviewed upwards so as to 27 
ensure that not only the cost of building capacity in these areas is fully covered by 28 
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international sources, but also that reluctant governments have enough incentives to 1 
implement politically difficult reforms. This can be done by providing results-based 2 
payments for governance reform using ad hoc and agreed metrics based on outputs and 3 
outcomes. Thirdly, the timeframe for the implementation of readiness activities must be 4 
reconsidered: readiness is not a transitory phase to allow the full implementation of 5 
REDD+, but rather a core pillar of the programme itself. As such, realistic objectives 6 
must be set over the long term and support must be planned to continue also after a 7 
country has progressed enough to enter a post-readiness phase, thereby allowing the 8 
gradual improvements in governance that can take several years. With regards to the 9 
scope of readiness, developments in areas such as technology and MRV capacity could 10 
be led by the private sector in the emerging voluntary and compliance markets. Donor 11 
countries’ priority until 2020 must be the provision of political, technical and financial 12 
support in the three areas of governance described above, with a particular focus on 13 
empowering national stakeholders. The international community must not shy away from 14 
the fact that, in many cases, reforming governance will mean changing the development 15 
path of large sectors of the economy as well as the power distribution across society.  16 
These changes might seem insufficient to some observers, for instance because they do 17 
not question the decisive role of industrialised nations’ insatiable demand for forest 18 
commodities. To others, they may seem politically unrealistic in the ever tighter political 19 
space left available in UNFCCC negotiations. Both arguments are valid, but it is here 20 
argued that reconceptualising readiness so as to promote genuine governance reforms in 21 
developing countries stretches ambition to what is practically and politically achievable at 22 
this stage. The proposed approach, in fact, is a step forward in ambition that builds on 23 
the current organisational framework and that, by combining socially-equitable 24 
institutionalism with the long-term use of market incentives, addresses the concerns of 25 
most REDD+ actors (Hiraldo and Tanner, 2011). What is required is a moderate 26 
ideological shift away from neoliberal principles of a scarcely regulated and privately-led 27 
approach which are still strong in the REDD+ arena but increasingly anachronistic after 28 
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the global financial crisis. Only by wagering on the power of public policies to shape a 1 
sustainable development path will UNFCCC Parties build the future success of REDD+. 2 
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